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Fighting Words: Targeting Speech in Armed Conflict 
A. Louis Evans† 
Abstract: Freedom of speech is considered one of the most fundamental 
human rights, but it is not without limits. In the context of an armed conflict, 
engaging in certain types of speech can form the basis for lethal targeting by 
States. Consensus exists in customary international law that speech-driven 
strikes constitute a lawful use of force under jus in bello standards. For example, 
a civilian who communicates the position of targets, or broadcasts tactical 
intelligence for a specific military operation has, by their speech, made 
themselves a lawful target. While customary international law agrees that 
speech-driven targeting is lawful, there has been little discussion by States or 
scholars of the requirements that form the basis for speech-driven targeting. The 
lack of scholarship concerning speech-driven targeting by States undercuts the 
legitimacy of speech-driven targeting and suggests that international law is not 
currently imposing adequate limits on the use of force by States against the 
fundamental human right of free speech. To justify speech-driven strikes, States 
and commentators use traditional tests based on a person’s actions to determine 
whether an individual has forfeited their protected status and is targetable. 
These action-based tests are problematic and lead to inconsistent results 
because they are designed to assess an individual’s actions as opposed to 
speech. To address this problem, this article will provide the first descriptive 
and normative analysis of speech-driven targeting. Descriptively, the article 
explains how speech-driven targeting currently exists in international law while 
simultaneously demonstrating the lack of guidance and agreement about what 
is required before the lawful use of lethal force. Next, from a normative 
perspective, the article proposes a core set of factors that should inform the 
speech-driven targeting analysis. The article then applies these factors to a real-
world example of America’s use of force in Yemen against Anwar al-Awlaki 
to explore how using the factors would affect the legality of such a strike. The 
article concludes that using these proposed factors would enhance protections 
for freedom of speech while simultaneously enhancing State decisions and 
actions from a substantive and procedural perspective. 
Cite as: A. Louis Evans, Fighting Words: Targeting Speech in Armed 
Conflict, 30 WASH. INT’L L.J. 598 (2021). 
INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2011, President Barack Obama 
announced that Anwar al-Awlaki was killed by a targeted 
American drone strike in Yemen and that his death marked a 
“major blow to al-Qaida’s most active operational affiliate.”1 
While Awlaki was a self-professed extremist and vocal leader in 
 
†  Judge Advocate, Major, U.S. Marine Corps. The views herein should not be 
attributed to any of the author’s institutional affiliates, including the U.S. Department of 
Defense. The author thanks his family Ali, Lou-Lou and Caroline Evans. 
1  President Barack Obama, Remarks at the Change of Command Ceremony for 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at Fort Meyer, Virginia (Sept. 30, 2011). 
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the al-Qaida terrorist network, he never personally conducted a 
violent attack or used armed force against the United States. 
Instead, Awlaki attacked the United States with speech by “calling 
on individuals in the U.S. and around the globe to kill innocent 
women and children to advance [his] murderous agenda.”2 Based 
on Awlaki’s violent speech as opposed to actions, the Department 
of Justice (DoJ) under the Obama administration determined that 
Awlaki posed an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
United States. And, based on this determined imminent threat, the 
DoJ determined that targeting Awlaki based on his speech was not 
unlawful.3  
Unfortunately, international law currently provides little 
guidance on what factors are relevant when making what this 
article calls “speech-driven” targeting decisions. However, the 
stakes are high: freedom of speech is considered one of the most 
fundamental human rights, and using lethal force is the most 
extreme response. When States have the unchecked ability to 
decide that any dissident speech beyond their borders can be met 
with lethal force, the consequences are dire for the marketplace of 
ideas made possible by freedom of speech. 
The lethal strike on Awlaki is only the most recent 
manifestation of speech-driven targeting. A long history of state 
practice indicates that speech-driven targeting is lawful under 
certain circumstances. Prominent examples of speech-driven 
targets include propagandists such as Wa'il Adil Hasan Salman al-
Fayad in 20164, recruiters like Awlaki in 2011, and planners and 
coordinators like Osama-bin Laden in 20115 and Qasem 
Soleimani in 2020.6 Despite the prevalence of speech-driven 
targeting, there has been very little discussion, by either States or 
 
2  Id. 
3
  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL 
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER 
OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE (2011) [HEREINAFTER DOJ WHITE PAPER ON 
LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN]. 
4  US Says It Killed IS Information Minister al-Fayad, BBC (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37390408. 
5  Helene Cooper, Bin Laden Dead, U.S. Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110502033900/http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/
01/bin-laden-dead-u-s-official-says/. 
6  Michael Crowley et al., U.S. Strike in Iraq Kills Qassim Suleimani, Commander 
of Iranian Forces, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/02/worl
d/middleeast/qassem-soleimani-iraq-iran-attack.html.  
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scholars, as to what factors determine whether an individual is a 
lawful target based on their speech. 
Traditional targeting decisions are made based on an 
individual’s actions, and for the purpose of this article, this kind 
of targeting will be referred to as “action-driven” targeting. The 
factors for traditional targeting, however, were developed only 
with a person’s actions in mind and not their speech. Therefore, 
the factors have historically been inconsistently and 
inappropriately applied in speech-driven targeting situations. This 
article contains both descriptive and normative descriptions of 
speech-driven targeting. In the descriptive portion, Part I of this 
article illustrates current state practice surrounding speech-driven 
strikes and demonstrates how States currently make speech-driven 
targeting decisions. Part II then examines speech-driven targeting 
in a historical context and provides an original analysis of speech-
driven targeting. 
After establishing that the current speech-driven targeting 
test lacks sufficient content to act as a rule for States, Part III looks 
to two primary sources to establish a core set of factors for a better 
speech-driven targeting test. First, Part III looks to the history set 
out in Part II to establish a core set of factors for speech-driven 
targeting. Next, in order to understand what speech is protected 
and what speech falls outside of protected limits, Part III turns to 
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Identifying what speech the United States values and protects, 
from a constitutional perspective, serves as instructive guidance 
as to what speech the United States should also value and protect 
in the international context. 
After creating factors for a speech-driven targeting test 
based on historical practice and domestic freedom of speech 
protections, Part IV applies this test to the real-world case of 
Anwar al-Awlaki. By applying the newly proposed factors to the 
United States’ lethal strike against Awlaki, Part IV will therefore 
provide greater texture to the proposed speech-driven targeting 
test. Furthermore, Part IV will demonstrate how international law 
can affect foreign policy decisions: as a constraint on action, as a 
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basis for justifying or legitimizing action, and by providing 
organizational structures and procedures.7 
As States monitor more speech and project lethal force 
further from the battlefield via technology, a speech-driven 
targeting test is crucial for creating international norms that 
properly balance the freedom of speech against the right of States 
to use force in self-defense. A properly developed speech-driven 
targeting test should serve as an essential check on States’ use of 
force against speech, but to do so requires a test with greater 
substantive content than exists at present. This article provides 
that content. 
I. JUS IN BELLO AND SPEECH-DRIVEN TARGETING 
The primary goal of a State in any armed conflict is the 
destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s ability to wage war. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) tempers the way in which 
States achieve this goal by requiring that States avoid unnecessary 
death, destruction, and suffering to the extent possible while 
waging war.8 To achieve this end, IHL sets forth four principles 
that, as applicable, must be addressed prior to the use of force in a 
jus in bello context.9 These four principles are: (1) military 
necessity, (2) humanity, (3) proportionality, and (4) distinction. 
These four principles apply to both individuals and objects. 
However, due to this article’s emphasis on speech-driven 
 
7  ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND 
THE ROLE OF LAW 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1974); see generally Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling 
or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 55 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 483 (2012) (discussing a structure for a descriptive and normative discussion for 
interpretations of international law). 
8  OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 2.3.1 
(2016) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR MANUAL]. The International Humanitarian Law is also 
referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict or the Law of War. For consistency, this Article 
will refer to this body of law as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).  
9  The applicability of the Law of Armed Conflict is limited to conflicts of 
sufficient scope and intensity to be classified as conflicts as opposed to law enforcement 
actions. If a conflict does not possess the appropriate level of scope or intensity it is covered 
by international human rights law (IHRL), which is akin to a law enforcement legal 
construct. For example, violent protestors planning to bomb a police station would be 
treated under an IHRL framework. This Article will deal exclusively with (IHL). INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, What Is the Difference Between IHL and Human Rights Law? 
(Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-difference-between-ihl-and-
human-rights-law.  
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targeting, the application of force against individuals will be the 
primary focus. 
When considering the use of force against an individual 
in an armed conflict, the foremost principle is that of military 
necessity. This principle permits any action that creates a distinct 
military advantage that helps defeat the enemy as quickly and 
efficiently as possible and is not otherwise prohibited under the 
law of war. 10 The first question in deciding whether speech-driven 
targeting is lawful is to determine whether targeting speech can 
result in a distinct military advantage. The next principle to 
consider is humanity, which forbids injury, destruction, or 
suffering that is unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military 
purpose.11 The third principle, proportionality, requires that the 
anticipated military advantage gained outweigh any death to 
civilians or destruction of civilian objects.12 Finally, the principle 
of distinction requires parties to distinguish between combatants 
and the civilian population.13 
These four factors taken together form a conjunctive test, 
whereby the expected violation of any one principle renders the 
proposed targeting unlawful. Therefore, any decision to target an 
individual requires consideration of all the applicable principles 
before the legality of the targeting may be determined. Although 
the fundamental principles of IHL outlined above are widely 
agreed upon, their application and interpretation varies between 
States.14 In an attempt to minimize variance, the Geneva 
Conventions recognized the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) as an impartial, neutral, and independent 
organization to promote, strengthen, and offer guidance on 
interpretation of IHL.15 For this reason, when comparing and 
 
10  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.2; see also NELS MELZER, INT’L 
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
11  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.3.  
12  Id. ¶ 2.4. 
13  Id. ¶ 2.5. 
14  See generally INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Casebook, Glossary, 
Fundamental Principles of IHL, https://casebook.icrc.org/glossary/fundamental-
principles-ihl (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
15  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Status Update: The ICRC’s Legal Standing 
Explained (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/status-update-icrcs-legal-
standing-explained.  
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examining any States’ interpretation of IHL, it is important to use 
the ICRC’s interpretation for comparison. 
Under both the United States’ and the ICRC’s principles, 
the principles of distinction and military necessity carry the most 
significant weight. However, all the principles must still be 
considered to assess the legality of speech-driven targeting. By 
examining state practice and commentary, Part I demonstrates that 
speech-driven targeting can be conducted in a manner consistent 
with these four principles and therefore in compliance with IHL. 
A. Military Necessity and Speech-Driven Targeting 
The first principle to consider in speech-driven targeting 
is military necessity. As outlined above, the critical element of 
military necessity is determining whether targeting an individual’s 
speech can result in a distinct military advantage or help to defeat 
the enemy. In making this decision, the United States’ and the 
ICRC’s guidance differ slightly. The United States’ guidance 
states that military necessity allows “all measures needed to defeat 
the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.”16 This position 
is in contrast to the ICRC guidance, which states that military 
necessity only permits actions that “weaken the military capacity” 
of the enemy.17 This difference in the two definitions centers on 
the scope what is targetable. The ICRC guidance is limited to 
targets tied to military capacity, while the United States’ 
definition is broader and centers on any targets that help defeat the 
enemy. This difference in definition, while slight, results in three 
notable disagreements in speech-driven targeting. The three 
primary differences between the United States’ and the ICRC’s 
interpretations are manifested in three classes of individuals: (1) 
planners and leaders of armed groups, (2) propagandists, and (3) 
recruiters and trainers. Discussion of targeting these three 
categories of individuals based on speech, spans across military 
necessity, proportionality, and distinction, and will be examined 
in greater detail in Part II of this article.  
Despite these differences, it is important to note that both 
the United States and the ICRC agree that speech alone can form 
 
16  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.2. 
17  INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Casebook, Glossary, Military Necessity, 
https://casebook.ICRC.org/glossary/military-necessity (last visited Feb. 15, 2020).  
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the basis for targeting under military necessity analysis. For 
example, both the United States and the ICRC would agree that an 
unarmed civilian who is verbally directing troops into firing 
positions on the frontline is targetable. This individual’s speech is 
directly enhancing the military capacity of the enemy and 
targeting her weakens the enemy’s military capacity, thereby 
making her a lawful target under the principle of military 
necessity. On the other end of the spectrum, is speech that supports 
military capacity. However, speech that supports military capacity 
does so in such an anemic manner that both the ICRC and the 
United States would agree this speech is not targetable. For 
example, a civilian who voices support for the military in general 
terms by wearing a yellow ribbon may help the military’s morale, 
but in such an anemic manner that the civilian would retain her 
protections no matter how vocal and fervent her verbal support is 
for the military.18  
Based on the preceding discussion, it is clear that on either 
end of the debate, some forms of speech meet the criteria for 
targeting under military necessity, while others unmistakably fall 
short. What is more concerning, however, is the vast area of 
speech between these two extremes that have insufficient state 
practice or law surrounding the speech to give clear indications of 
the speech’s status. This lack of clarity can be fatal for individuals 
that misjudge an enemy’s interpretation of international law in an 
armed conflict. As seen in analysis below, similar concerns arise 
when analyzing the principle of distinction. 
B. Humanity and Speech-Driven Targeting 
The principle of humanity forbids “the infliction of 
suffering, injury or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a 
legitimate military purpose.”19 Since it has been established that 
speech-driven targeting can serve a legitimate military purpose, 
there is little left to consider under the principle of humanity, as 
this principle only prohibits injury or destruction that does not 
have a legitimate military purpose. The fact that speech-driven 
 
18  Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[M]ere sympathy 
for or association with an enemy organization does not render an individual a member of 
that enemy organization's armed forces. Instead, the individual must have some sort of 
‘structured’ role in the ‘hierarchy’ of the enemy force.”). 
19  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 2.3. 
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targeting serves a legitimate military purpose, however, does not 
allow the targeting of speech by any means available. There must 
still be consideration of the anticipated military advantage gained 
versus the damage to civilian objects or people, which invokes the 
principle of proportionality. 
C. Proportionality and Speech-Driven Targeting 
Proportionality requires that when making targeting 
decisions, any anticipated collateral damage or death to civilian 
objects or people cannot exceed the expected or anticipatory 
military advantage gained.20 It might be an intuitive reaction of 
liberal societies to argue that lethal force is never an appropriate 
response to speech, or that any collateral damage in a speech-
driven strike is excessive. This position, however, is not supported 
by States or commentators either in state practice or rhetoric (e.g., 
no State has ever claimed that speech-driven targeting is per se 
unlawful). It must be accepted, as outlined by numerous examples 
cited in this paper, that speech-driven targeting is practiced by all 
States in some form. Therefore, when conducting speech-driven 
strikes, so long as the military advantage gained by targeting the 
speech21 is not outweighed by the collateral damage to civilians 
and civilian objects, the proportionality requirement will be met. 
D. Distinction and Speech-Driven Targeting 
Distinction is often the most challenging of the four 
principles to apply in traditional action-driven targeting decisions, 
and the same holds in the examination of speech-driven targeting. 
Cited by the International Court of Criminal Justice as a “cardinal” 
rule in armed conflicts, distinction prohibits direct targeting of 
 
20  Note that the definition for proportionality under jus in bello differs from the 
definition for proportionality under jus ad bellum. Under jus ad bellum, a state’s decision 
to use force cannot exceed the force used in the attack suffered. Robert Sloane, The Cost 
of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 47, 52–53 (2009). Ample opportunity 
exists for further scholarly research and debate as to what forms and kinds of speech are 
sufficient to warrant the use of force in the jus ad bellum context, but they are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
21  Throughout this article the term speech or speaker are used interchangeably 
when discussing targeting, just as act and actor are used interchangeably when discussing 
action-driven targeting.  
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civilians in an armed conflict.22 Determining what speech causes 
a civilian to lose their protections and become a lawful target 
requires careful examination. 
In an armed conflict, whether international or non-
international, individuals become distinguishable as targets based 
on two primary theories.23 First, individuals may be targeted based 
on their status as members of the military or of an organized armed 
group.24 For example, if State A is in an armed conflict with State 
B, all of State B’s soldiers, with minor exceptions, are lawful 
targets for State A’s military.25 Under this paradigm, it is not a 
person’s specific actions that make them targetable, but their 
status as a member of a government military force or organized 
armed group. Targeting decisions based on an individual’s status 
are referred to in international law as “status-based” targeting.26 
The second category is “conduct-based” targeting, which 
allows the targeting of any individual, regardless of their military 
affiliation, if that individual is engaged in conduct hostile to 
friendly forces.27 In IHL, this analysis of whether an individual 
has engaged in hostilities and becomes targetable is referred to as 
direct participation in hostilities (DPH).28 For instance, under a 
 
22  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 
I.C.J. 226, 257 (July 8). 
23  An International Armed Conflict (IAC) is covered by Geneva Conventions 
Common Article 2 and is when the belligerents are both States, e.g. State A is fighting 
State B. A Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC) is covered by Geneva Conventions 
Common Article 3, and is when a State is fighting a Non-State Armed Group. See Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field (First Geneva Convention) art. 2–3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.  
24  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
43(1)–(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
25  Exceptions include non-combatants such as doctors, chaplains and those that 
are hors de combat. 
26  U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE, GENERAL’S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., INT’L AND 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK 137 (5th ed., 2015) 
[hereinafter ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK]. 
27  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 13(3), 
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 610 [hereinafter Protocol II]. 
28  DPH indicates when a civilian has forfeited their protections from being made 
the object of an attack. While what specific actions constitute DPH differs by State, the 
concept of DPH and the loss of protections remains the same. See generally LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8; NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
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traditional action-driven targeting test, a civilian who picks up a 
rifle and starts shooting at enemy troops is targetable, regardless 
of any previous protected status. Individuals are targetable for the 
duration of their direct participation.29 International law refers to 
those who become targetable based on their conduct as “conduct-
based” targets because their personal conduct has made them 
targetable.30  
Status-based and conduct-based targeting designations 
are well accepted in international law, but were designed with an 
individual’s actions in mind rather than their speech. Despite this, 
the categories remain valid when examining targeting based on an 
individual’s speech, and these established definitions will be used 
for the purposes of examining speech-driven targeting. 
1. Conduct-based targeting in the speech-driven 
context. — Conduct-based targeting centers upon the actions of an 
individual. Once an individual’s conduct crosses a threshold of 
participation in hostilities, they are said to have directly 
participated in hostilities and are targetable. The conduct that 
provides the required direct participation for targeting often falls 
into one of two categories: (1) if an individual conducts an 
“attack,” or (2) if their actions are going to cause an “imminent 
attack.” While this paradigm was designed with an individual’s 
actions in mind, the categories of attack and imminent attack again 
remain valid when examining targeting based on an individual’s 
speech. Accordingly, these categories will be used in the 
examination of speech-driven conduct-based targeting.  
1.a. Speech constituting an attack. — While the 
definitions of “attack” and “imminent attack” vary among States, 
the concepts are consistent. An attack is generally defined as the 
actual use of force or violence in the immediate present, against a 
party to the conflict.31 Imminent attacks are those that have not yet 
occurred but will transpire in the determinate future.32 As it is the 
 
29  It is important to note that there is significant debate surrounding the question 
of duration of participation. There are a wide range of positions from States and 
commentators on how long an individual is targetable for after D.P.H.’ing. While this 
debate is outside the scope of the speech-driven targeting debate, it is important to note.  
30  ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 26, 137. 
31
  MELZER, supra note 10, at 45; U.S. ARMY, JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S 
LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK 473 (2015) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
32
  MELZER, supra note 10, at 45; OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 473.  
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more concrete and immediate concept, how attacks manifest 
themselves in speech-driven context will be addressed first. 
One illustration of an action-driven “attack” is a civilian 
who fires a rifle at troops. By their conduct, this civilian has 
committed an attack and is a lawful target. While an attack is easy 
to define in the action-driven context, it is more challenging to 
define for speech-driven targeting. Indeed, based on the 
immediacy requirement of an attack under conduct-based 
targeting, it is difficult to argue that speech alone can ever 
constitute an actual attack. While speech and words can inspire 
others to act, speech itself can never be considered an act of force 
or violence. Further, no state manual or interpretative guidance 
reviewed for this article indicated that speech could rise to the 
level of harm to be considered an attack.33 Thus, under speech-
driven targeting, it does not seem that an individual could conduct 
a verbal attack. 
For example, the actions against the United States on 
September 11, 2001, were an attack within the definition outlined 
above. Despite this, it would be difficult to argue that the architect 
of the attack, Osama bin Laden, committed a conduct-based 
attack.34 While bin Laden planned and directed the attack via 
speech, he did not carry out the actual attack.35 Because speech 
itself cannot be considered an attack, under conduct-based 
targeting, the only remaining possibility for lawful speech-driven 
targeting rests on the premise that speech can constitute an 
“imminent attack.” 
 
33  See generally LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8; THE JOINT DOCTRINE & 
CONCEPTS CENTRE, U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW 
OF ARMED CONFLICT (2004); DEFENCE PUBL’G SERV., COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, MANUAL ON THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (2006); CANADA 
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT MANUAL AT THE 
OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS (2001). 
34  This is not to say that targeting bin Laden was unlawful under international law. 
This example merely helps to illustrate and understand how to frame speech-based 
targeting decisions. 
35  Of course, some would argue that in the bin-Laden example, the “attack” 
distinction is moot because as a member of al-Qaeda, bin Laden could be targeted under a 
status-based targeting analysis. However, this counter-argument fails because the analysis 
of speech-driven status-based targeting will show that, without additional action, speech 
alone is insufficient to confer status as a member of a military or organized armed group 
for the purposes of “status-based” targeting. 
JUNE 2021 FIGHTING WORDS 609 
 
1.b. Speech constituting an imminent attack. — In 
contrast to an attack, an “imminent attack” is one that has not yet 
occurred, yet its manifestation is instant and overwhelming.36 An 
example of an action-driven imminent attack is a civilian who 
picks up a loaded rifle and aims it at troops.37 Although the civilian 
has yet to attack or cause harm, their actions and intent to commit 
an attack are obvious, and the civilian is therefore targetable. This 
section concludes that speech can form the basis of an imminent 
attack, thereby justifying the targeting of individuals based on 
speech. 
Three well-accepted examples illustrate how speech can 
constitute an imminent attack. The first example of an imminent 
attack through speech is a civilian who provides tactical 
directions, such as acting as a spotter for indirect fire.38 The 
second example returns to the bin-Laden example above. 
Although bin-Laden’s actions did not constitute an attack on the 
United States on September 11, 2001, his speech planning the 
attack and directing others to conduct the attack did constitute an 
imminent attack. The third example is a civilian acting as a 
lookout, alerting enemy forces to troop movements.39 These 
examples are all widely accepted as situations where speech 
constitutes an imminent attack.40  
Despite agreement that speech can constitute an imminent 
attack, disagreement remains among States as to precisely what 
kinds of speech are sufficiently imminent to justify the use of 
force. Examining the positions on each end of the imminence 
debate helps to frame the discussion in Part II. As noted 
throughout this article, the ICRC has a generally restrictive view 
on when civilians lose their protections and become targetable. 
The ICRC maintains a particularly conservative view of how 
 
36  OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 473. 
37  What qualifies as an “imminent attack” or “hostile intent” is difficult to define 
in the abstract. Recognizing this, the San Remo Manual, a non-binding codification 
of customary international law, gives the following non-exhaustive list: a. Aiming or 
directing weapons, b. Adopting an attack profile, c. Closing within weapon release range, 
d. Illuminating with radar or laser designators, e. Passing targeting information, f. Laying 
or preparing to lay naval mines. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, 22 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995). See also 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3.1. 
38  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3.1. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
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closely an individual’s actions must be associated with the 
battlefield before they constitute DPH and provide the legal 
grounds for targeting.41 Despite this restrictive view, ICRC 
interpretive guidance supports the position that speech can 
constitute an imminent attack. The ICRC does not say this 
directly, but includes “transmitting tactical targeting information 
for an attack,” as well as verbal planning and direction of specific 
attacks as examples of imminent attacks.42  
Requiring targetable speech to be in close proximity to the 
battlefield aligns with ICRC’s position on action-driven targeting 
requirements. In particular, the ICRC requires that actions directly 
cause harm and be only one causal step away from an attack to be 
considered imminent.43 For example, under ICRC interpretations, 
generally recruiting people to fight in a conflict is too broad, but 
recruiting people to conduct a specific attack is only one causal 
step away from an attack and therefore targetable behavior.44 The 
one casual step requirement is the subject of tremendous debate 
and criticism by States and commentators. Specifically, the United 
States believes that the one casual step requirement is an overly 
restrictive means of determining when an individual has 
demonstrated hostile intent.45  
If the ICRC and States that follow the ICRC guidance 
represent the more conservative end of the spectrum in assessing 
imminence, there must be an examination of the other end of the 
spectrum. In defining the limits of what would not be considered 
targetable speech, the ICRC specifically mentions enemy 
“recruiters, trainers, and propagandists” as too many causal steps 
removed from an imminent attack to be lawful targets.46 State 
practice demonstrates that a number of States disagree with this 
assertion.47 
 
41  Ryan Kresbach, Totality of the Circumstances: The DoD Law of War Manual 
and the Evolving Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 9 J. NAT'L SEC. L. & POL'Y 
125, 156 (2017).  
42  MELZER, supra note 10, at 48.  
43  Id. at 53. 
44  Id.  
45  Stephen Pomper, Toward a Limited Consensus on the Loss of Civilian Immunity 
in Non-International Armed Conflict: Making Progress through Practice, in 88 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES, NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 186 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012). 
46  MELZER, supra note 10, at 34.  
47  Pomper, supra note 45 at 187–90. 
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Using the three categories of recruiters, trainers, and 
propagandists is useful for two reasons. First, each of these 
categories uses speech to conduct imminent attacks, whether by 
verbally recruiting others to conduct attacks, verbally training 
others to conduct attacks, or verbally encouraging the population 
at large to conduct attacks via propaganda. Second, this list is 
helpful because, on numerous occasions, the United States and 
other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have 
targeted and killed recruiters, trainers, and propagandists, creating 
clear categories of disagreement among States and the ICRC for 
what constitutes an imminent attack in speech-driven targeting 
analysis.48  
The United States’ position is that even though 
individuals from these categories might not be engaged in a 
specific imminent attack, their speech is sufficient to justify 
targeting because they are seeking to “inspire, enable, and direct 
attacks.”49 What constitutes “imminence” is the gray area that 
consumes this part of IHL and will be examined further in Part II 
and used to produce a proposed rule for speech-driven targeting in 
Part III. Despite disagreement as to the precise definition of 
imminence, it is important to note that there is a general consensus 
that speech can form the legal basis for conduct-based targeting, 
so long as the speech represents an imminent attack. 
2. Status-based targeting in the speech-driven 
context. — State practice indicates that speech alone cannot 
support status-based targeting. This conclusion is based on an 
examination of status-based targeting in both the formal military 
 
48  Prominent examples in the war on terror include Anwar al-Awlaki, Ahmad 
Abousamara (aka Abu Sulayman ash-Shami and Abu Maysarah ash-Shami), and Abu 
Muhammad al-Furqan (aka Dr, Wa’ik Adel Hasan Salman al-Fayad). See, e.g., Mark 
Mazzetti et al., How a U.S. Citizen Came to Be in America’s Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-
a-us-citizen-in-americas-cross-hairs.html; see also Paul Cruickshank, ISIS Lifts Veil on 
American at Heart of its Propaganda Machine, CNN (Apr. 7, 2017), https://edition.cnn.c
om/2017/04/06/middleeast/isis-american-propaganda-editor/; see also IS Confirms Death 
of Propaganda Chief Abu Mohammed al-Furqan, BBC (Oct. 11, 2016), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37619225. 
49  Owen Bowcott, Is the Targeting of ISIS Member Sally Jones Legally Justified? 
UK Attorney General Set Out Legal Advice That Allows Such Actions But Strike Raises 
Question of Whether UK is Operating Kill-List, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2017, 10:39 AM) 
(quoting Jeremy Wright, Queens Counsel), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct
/12/is-targeting-of-isis-member-sally-jones-legally-justified. 
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context and the more informal context of organized armed 
groups.50 In traditional militaries, civilians are regularly 
transformed into combatants by swearing an oath of enlistment, 
going to basic training, and taking up arms. In non-traditional 
military settings of organized armed groups, like the Islamic State 
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), civilians achieve a similar 
transformation by swearing an oath of loyalty to a group and 
taking up arms against the enemy. In each case, it is necessary to 
determine when an individual transforms from a civilian to a 
combatant, thus becoming a lawful target. The “when” is of 
crucial import because it determines whether swearing an oath 
(i.e., speech alone), is sufficient for a civilian to lose protections 
from attack or whether there must be further action, such as 
training or taking up arms. 
2.a. Speech conferring status in the military. — As IHL 
has expanded protections to civilians and made the distinction 
between civilians and the military more important, the question of 
when an individual is targetable, based on status, has become a 
matter of crucial import. 51 The most formal targetable position an 
individual can assume is as a member of a state’s military. Despite 
the importance of this status, United States’ guidance on what 
precisely transforms a civilian into a formal member of the 
military is lacking. This want of guidance means that it is unclear 
whether an oath of enlistment, i.e.., speech alone, is sufficient to 
provide a legal basis for targeting. Thus, to determine the United 
States’ position on speech-driven targeting, there must be an 
examination of United States’ state practice. 
While current United States’ guidance is silent, historical 
guidance and state practice is not. The 1863 Lieber Code, a 
general order signed by President Lincoln, dictated how soldiers 
should comport themselves in wartime and is informative as one 
 
50  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 4.3. 
51  Article 22 states: “[A]s civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so 
has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction between the 
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the hostile country itself, with its men 
in arms.” INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE U.S. IN THE FIELD, 
GENERAL ORDERS NO. 100, art. 22 (War Dept., Washington D.C., 1863) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter Lieber Code].  
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of the first codifications of IHL.52 In determining who is a lawful 
combatant, the Lieber Code states that “so soon as a man is armed 
by a sovereign government and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity, 
he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are 
not individual crimes or offenses.”53 The conjunctive “and” 
included in the Lieber Code means that, in addition to an “oath of 
fidelity,” (i.e., speech), a civilian must also take some action, such 
as taking up arms, before they become targetable based on their 
status. This early codification of state practice makes clear that 
speech alone is insufficient to transform a civilian into a 
combatant. Unfortunately, the clarity provided by the Lieber Code 
no longer exists in current United States doctrine. 
Due to the lack of explicit guidance, state practice 
provides the only source on whether speech alone can cause a 
civilian to lose their protections from attack. Practice by the 
United States and other States indicates that speech alone cannot 
support status-based targeting. The state practice in question 
centers on non-combatants. Although all military members take 
the same oath of enlistment, not all military members are 
targetable. Certain military members, such as chaplains, are non-
targetable and are labeled as non-combatants and do not carry 
wepons.54 Despite taking the same oath and engaging in the same 
speech to join the military as combatants, it appears to be the 
action of not taking up arms that preserves non-combatants’ 
protected status. Thus, current state practice seems to support the 
action-driven requirements outlined by the Lieber Code. 
In keeping with the explicit requirements outlined by the 
Lieber Code, because non-combatants have not followed their 
oath with action, they are not targetable. Since these non-
combatants have joined the armed forces through the same speech 
as other military members, but retain a non-targetable status, an 
inference can be made that speech alone is insufficient to 
transform a civilian into a combatant based on their status as a 
member of a military. Because States regularly recognize and 
 
52  See generally Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States 
in the Field (Lieber Code) (24 Apr. 1863), INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/110.  
53  Lieber Code, supra note 51, at art. 57.  
54  Non-combatants, like civilians, can of course lose their protections if they DPH. 
LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8. 
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practice this distinction and do so out of a sense of legal 
obligation, there exists a presumption under customary 
international law that military oaths alone are insufficient to 
support status-based targeting.55 
2.b. Speech conferring status in organized armed 
groups. — The informal membership in organized armed groups 
stands in contrast to the formal membership in state militaries. 
This informal association makes assessing what precise event 
denotes membership even more difficult. However, the question 
is of significant import, as most modern conflicts involve 
organized armed groups. Determining membership in organized 
armed groups based on speech is further complicated by two 
additional factors. First, the concept of organized armed groups in 
armed conflicts is a relatively new concept when compared to 
formal military membership.56 Second, States rarely provide 
candid, unclassified explanations as to the rationale behind 
targeting decisions.57 Despite the difficulties presented by these 
two factors, state practice, coupled with advisory opinions, 
indicates that speech alone cannot establish membership in an 
organized armed group.  
Because the United States rarely declassifies the basis for 
individual targeting decisions, it is essential to understand the 
overarching intent behind United States’ practice. Through both 
action and verbiage, the United States expresses a strong bias and 
intent to assess the liability of combatants—privileged and 
unprivileged—similarly.58 Because of the intent for similar 
treatment, and because Section 1.4.2.1 of this article established 
 
55  Customary international law is typically defined as law that results from a 
general and consistent practice by States, which the States follow out of a sense of legal 
obligation, or acceptance of the norm. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary 
International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 452 (2000). Therefore, understanding past state 
practice in related circumstances is instructive as to the state of customary international 
law in a particular area.  
56  Gloria Gaggioli, Targeting Individuals Belonging to an Armed Group, 51 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 901, 904 (2018). 
57  Id. at 914. 
58  This distinction is between persons who have met the qualifications to receive 
the privileges of combatant status and those who have not; the terms “lawful combatant” 
and “unlawful combatant” are also used. The United States has made its position clear 
regarding similar considerations for combatant liability purposes in two aspects. First, in 
the temporal aspect of for how long an individual is targetable, and second, in the functional 
aspect of targeting concerning what actions constitute a continuous combat function to 
justify targeting. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 4.3.2.2, 5.8.4.2.  
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that the United States does not consider speech sufficient to 
establish combatant status in the military context, there should be 
a bias for arriving at the same conclusion in the context of 
membership in organized armed groups.59  
In addition to the Lieber Code, one of the oldest 
codifications of IHL, and thus the best evidence of historical state 
practice, are the Hague Conventions. While the Lieber Code only 
applied to United States soldiers, the Hague Conventions, first 
signed in 1899, were international in nature and signed by 51 
States, including the United States.60 Because the United States is 
a signatory to 1907 The Hague Convention, the factors listed are 
more than evidence of historical state practice; they also provide 
a baseline for current United States’ interpretations of 
international law.61 Specifically, the 1907 Hague Convention 
spells out the “Qualifications of Belligerents” to include not only 
regular armies but also informal groups, including organized 
armed groups.62 Of the factors listed, none reference oaths of 
loyalty or speech as a factor to determine belligerent status. 
However, the factors are not exclusive, and state practice may 
expand them.  
Although the United States’ Department of Defense 
(DoD) Law of War Manual (Law of War Manual) does not 
represent the official positions of the United States, it does provide 
a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when assessing 
membership in an organized armed group. 63 Only one of the 
factors listed concerns speech: “[f]ormal membership in an armed 
group might be indicated by . . . taking an oath of loyalty to an 
OAG [Organized Armed Group] [emphasis added].”64 Thus, the 
 
59  Id. 
60  Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its 




61  Convention Between the United States & Other Powers Respecting the Law & 
Customs of War on Land, Feb. 28, 1910, 36 Stat. 2277. 
62  Id. at art. 1-2. The list includes, militia, volunteer corps and levee en masse.  
63  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, vi. 
64  Id. ¶5.7.3.1; see also REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
GUIDING THE UNITED STATE’S USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL 
SECURITY OPERATIONS, THE WHITE HOUSE (2016), https://www.state.gov/wp-
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Manual implies that while speech might indicate membership in 
an organized armed group, it is not a stand-alone factor. This 
position is supported by DoJ motions written and filed in the 
Guantanamo Bay Litigation Cases, which state that: 
Evidence relevant to a determination that an 
individual joined with or became part of al-Qaida 
or Taliban forces might range from . . . an oath of 
loyalty, to more functional evidence, such as 
training with al-Qaida . . . or taking positions 
with enemy forces. In each case, given the nature 
of the irregular forces, and the practice of their 
participants or members to try to conceal their 
affiliations, judgments about the detainability of 
a particular individual will necessarily turn on the 
totality of the circumstances.65 
Although this position considers detainability rather than 
targetability, it supports the argument that the totality of the 
circumstances, not a single speech act, establishes membership in 
an organized armed group. Furthermore, extensive research into 
historical practice did not reveal any instances where a member of 
an armed group was targeted solely based on an oath of loyalty.66 
Although United States’ domestic criminal law is at best 
persuasive on United States’ interpretations of IHL, the DoD Law 
of War Manual cites to the United States’ Federal Cases and 
United States criminal code, and it is of note in this context.67 In 
 
content/uploads/2019/10/Report-to-Congress-on-legal-and-policy-frameworks-guiding-
use-of-military-force-.pdf; see also Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed 
Groups and the I.C.R.C. "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Interpretive Guidance, 42 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 690–91 (2009); Eran Shamir-Borer, Fight, Forge, and 
Fund: Three Select Issues on Targeting of Persons, 51 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 959, 963 
(2018). 
65  Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority 
Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 6–7, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee 
Litigation, 624 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Misc. No.08-442), U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 
Lexis 96279 (emphasis added).  
66  The court cases cited by the Manual involved situations where members of 
organized armed groups had appealed their convictions, and the courts made a ruling on 
their status based on factors exhibited. In most instances the individual was targetable 
based on their conduct as opposed to status. Examples of classifications found included 
“fighter, bomber, bomb maker, planner, propagandist, financer, leader, etc.” LAW OF WAR 
MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶¶ 5.7.3.1-5.7.3.2.  
67  Id.  
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addition to these DoJ memos, both the United States Code and the 
United States Supreme Court have clarified that mere association 
or oaths to organized armed groups, in isolation, do not constitute 
unlawful behavior.68 Instead, the Code makes clear that some 
further action must accompany the oath before an individual can 
be convicted of supporting terrorism.69  
While the DoD Law of War Manual lists “taking an oath” 
as a factor, based on stated United States intent in interpreting 
IHL, historical state practice, contemporary state practice, and 
application of United States domestic law, it seems that the United 
States does not consider speech alone sufficient to establish 
membership in an organized armed group. In other words, simply 
verbally pledging allegiance to an organized armed group, without 
further conduct, does not appear sufficient to establish the legal 
basis for status-based targeting.70 Instead, there must be some 
additional conduct, combined with the speech, that makes a 
civilian targetable. Examples of typical additional conduct that 
occur after swearing an oath could include, but are not limited to: 
basic training, receiving uniforms, official training, etc. The fact 
that some additional targetable conduct must accompany 
declarations of status means that status-based targeting in the 
speech-driven context is not a stand-alone category. Even though 
status-based targeting is not a stand-alone category, as seen below, 
it is possible that speech declaring status could interact with 
speech constituting targetable conduct to satisfy the requirement 
for status-based targeting in the speech-driven context. 
3. The interaction of conduct and status-based 
targeting. — Before concluding the discussion on distinction, it is 
necessary to consider how conduct and status-based targeting 
interact in the speech-driven context. Based on the conclusions 
reached in the above sections, status-based targeting cannot be 
established simply by verbally declaring membership. Rather, in 
 
68  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2010). 
69  18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B Notes to Decisions states, “18 USCS § 2339B does not 
penalize mere association with foreign terrorist organization; what it prohibits is act of 
giving material support. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B (Notes to Decision, §2 Constitutionality & 
LexisNexis 2021); see also United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 149–150, 175 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
70  Since speech cannot make someone a status based combatant, it stands to reason 
that speech alone cannot rescind that status either.  
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order to establish membership, there must be some conduct that 
accompanies the verbal declaration. There should be an 
understanding that this required additional conduct could be in the 
form of speech. As such, it is possible that verbal declaration of 
membership when coupled with targetable verbal conduct could 
form the legal basis for speech-driven status-based targeting. For 
example, someone who met status-based criteria (such as 
proclaiming status in an armed group) would not be targetable 
until they engaged in conduct-based criteria (such as directing 
specific fighters to carry out a specific attack). However, after 
both of these criteria were met the person would be targetable as 
a member of an organized armed group until they take affirmative 
steps to end their membership in the group.71 Based on the state 
practice examined in previous sections, it appears that speech can 
support status-based targeting, but only after a basis for conduct-
based targeting has been established. 
This interpretation, supported by state practice, takes 
aspects from both the ICRC and United States’ position to bridge 
the middle ground between them. By requiring conduct-based 
speech to serve as the foundation for speech-driven targeting, the 
interpretation described above adopts the portion of the ICRC’s 
position on DPH, limiting the definition of participation to 
“measures preparatory to the execution of a specific act.”72 
 
71  When membership in an organized armed group and the accompanying 
targetable status ends is a matter of some debate in the traditional action-driven context. 
States and commentators disagree about how long the targetable status endures and what 
steps need to be taken to end membership or participation in hostilities. The intricacies of 
this debate need not be repeated here, but it is interesting to consider whether a targetable 
status based only on speech can be rescinded by speech alone. To answer this question, it 
is once again helpful to look to action-driven targeting to make analogous comparisons. In 
traditional action-driven targeting the ICRC and the United States specifically state that 
one of the factors used to determine whether an individual is still a target includes 
renouncement of membership or an informal public declaration that the individual no 
longer wishes to participate in hostilities. Therefore, if speech can rescind an action-driven 
targetable status, it would stand to reason that genuine renunciations could end a speech-
driven targetable status. The qualifier of “genuine” is added to renunciations in order to 
prevent individuals from taking part in hostilities, then renouncing membership or 
participation in hostilities to regain civilian protections. Therefore, while speech alone can 
terminate a speech-driven targeting designation, it must be a genuine statement, and may 
need to be accompanied by actions that demonstrate the authenticity. See generally LAW 
OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8; NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009). 
72  MELZER, supra note 10, at 65–68. 
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Simultaneously, this interpretation embraces the United States’ 
position on status-based targeting in that there is no “revolving 
door” – once someone has participated in hostilities, by action or 
by speech, they are targetable until they permanently cease their 
participation.73 This middle-ground interpretation in the area of 
speech is appropriate due to the nature of speech. As this article 
has made clear, freedom of speech rightfully holds a more 
protected place in both United States and international policy. Due 
to speech’s protected status, States should bear a higher burden 
before placing an individual in a more permanent status-based 
target category. Speech-driven targeting allows for speech to 
serve as a more permanent status-based targeting status, but only 
if preceded by speech that justifies conduct-based targeting. 
While this distinction between justifications for targeting 
may seem trivial, it is a crucial distinction. Under a conduct-based 
targeting justification, an individual is only targetable for such 
time as they commit targetable conduct. In status-based targeting, 
a person is targetable for the duration of the conflict regardless of 
their conduct. If in the speech-driven context, conduct-based 
targeting can be used to support status-based targeting, an 
individual would be targetable for a longer period, thereby 
enlarging the window during which States could take action.  
The United States’ state practice pertaining to these four 
fundamental principles of IHL, make clear that speech can form 
the legal basis for the use of force under a jus in bello analysis. 
Throughout Part I, there exists a salient counterargument that the 
conclusions reached are based too much on inference rather than 
explicit state guidance or explanation of practice. Although this 
counterargument may weaken the case surrounding the speech-
driven targeting analysis, it strengthens this article’s overarching 
argument. By acknowledging that insufficient guidance or 
explanation of practice exists, this counterargument demonstrates 
that more defined standards are necessary in the area of speech-
driven targeting. 
 
73  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.4; U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field 
Manual 6-27/U.S. Marine Corps, Techniques Publication 11-10C, The Commander's 
Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare (Aug. 7, 2019), ¶ 2-18, 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19354_FM%206-
27%20_C1_FINAL_WEB_v2.pdf. 
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Part I demonstrated the United States and other States 
practice speech-driven targeting; the ICRC, as the primary 
independent commentator in IHL, accepts the practice. 
Specifically, Part I demonstrated all speech-driven targeting 
decisions must center on a discussion of what speech constitutes 
an “imminent attack,” which denotes direct participation in 
hostilities. However, in establishing the existence of speech-
driven targeting, Part I also showed there is genuine disagreement 
surrounding the definition of imminence. Although similar 
debates regarding imminence exist in the context of action-driven 
targeting, the debate is different in speech-driven targeting due to 
the vital status of speech as a fundamental human right.74 
II. HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY USES OF 
SPEECH-DRIVEN TARGETING 
Because there is universal agreement that speech is a 
protected fundamental human right, there must be similar 
agreement on what speech falls outside of this protected rights 
status and is therefore targetable. Clear guidelines as to the 
boundaries of protected speech in an armed conflict means that 
individuals can express themselves without fear of retribution are 
based on a nebulous standard. Simultaneously, clear boundaries 
allow states to act in self-defense when speech truly constitutes an 
imminent attack. In order to construct a meaningful test, Part II 
examines three categories of current and historical state practice 
pertaining to: (1) individuals who engage in propaganda; (2) 
planners and leaders who take part in hostilities by verbally 
directing others; and (3) recruiters and trainers who verbally 
encourage others to join in hostilities. Assessing how individuals 
in these three categories are targeted, and the international 
community’s response will achieve two goals. First, this 
descriptive approach will clarify where disagreement exists in the 
application of speech-driven targeting. Second, this approach will 
show where a proposed test would need to focus in order to 
resolve this disagreement. 
 
74  Both in the US and international community cite the freedom of speech and 
expression as paramount in both the U.S. Constitution and the Universal Declaration of 
Human rights. U.S. CONST. amend. I; G.A. Res. 217(III) A, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948), at 19.  
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A. Propagandists 
The first recorded historical description of targeting based 
on speech alone concerns propagandists and comes from a 
controversial and influential medieval Muslim jurist named Ibn 
Taymiyya.75 During the 14th century, Ibn Taymiyya wrote on a 
number of topics, including under what circumstances protected 
classes of persons could be considered appropriate targets.76 In the 
14th century, women were considered non-combatants by almost 
all standards. Ibn Taymiyya was clear in his writing that, despite 
this protected status, women could become legitimate targets if 
they engaged in propaganda.77 While international law did not 
have the same structure as today, the logic behind Taymiyya’s 
conclusion is clear. Targeting propagandists satisfies military 
necessity because propagandists provide a clear military 
advantage to the enemy, and the distinction is arguably satisfied 
because propagandists participate in hostilities by encouraging 
others to engage in attacks. Based on this logic, there has been an 
argument since the 14th century that propagandists are targetable 
based on their speech.  
Six centuries later, NATO used similar logic to justify 
targeting propagandists during the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. In 
justifying strikes against media targets, NATO Air Commodore 
David Wilby stated, “Serb radio and TV is an instrument of 
propaganda and repression, it has filled the air waves with hate 
and with lies over the years and especially now. It is therefore a 
legitimate target in this campaign.”78 Providing further legitimacy 
to this position, British Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that 
“these television stations are part of the apparatus of dictatorship 
and power of Milosevic . . . [a]nd we are entirely justified as the 
 
75
  IBN TAIMIYYA, ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW IN ISLAM 141 (Omar A. Farrukh 
trans., Khayat Book & Publ’g, 1st ed. 1966); Naser Ghobadzdeh & Shahram Akbarzadeh, 
Sectarianism and the Prevalence of ‘Othering’ in Islamic Thought, THIRD WORLD 
QUARTERLY 694–97 (2015).  
76  While Tamiyya did not write in terms that included modern legal language such 
as “civilian” or “direct participation in hostilities” he did write on when protected classes 
of people could be attacked. The best example of this is his controversial interpretation that 
Muslims could declare fatwa against other Muslims. DEVIN SPRINGER ET AL., ISLAMIC 
RADICALISM AND GLOBAL JIHAD 29 (Geo. Univ. Press 2009). 
77  Id. 
78  Press Release, NATO, David Wilby, Air Commodore, and Fabrizio Maltinti, 
Commander (Apr. 8, 1999) https://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990408a.htm. 
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NATO alliance in damaging and attacking all these targets.”79 
Thus, it is clear that the United Kingdom, and likely NATO, take 
the position that speech, which is part of the enemy’s state 
apparatus, is targetable under a military necessity analysis. 
The position outlined above, however, seems to ignore the 
distinction analysis and has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, there 
is a fine line between a propagandist who uses speech to inspire 
support generally and those who use speech to direct specific 
attacks. Highlighting this distinction and discrediting the United 
Kingdom’s interpretation, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) Final Report on the NATO 
bombing campaign, found that:  
Disrupting government propaganda may help to 
undermine the morale of the population and the 
armed forces, but justifying an attack on a civilian 
facility on such grounds alone may not meet the 
"effective contribution to military action" and 
"definite military advantage" criteria required.80 
This tension between the NATO and ICTY position is concerning, 
as it demonstrates the vast amount of speech-driven targeting 
undefined under international law. This lack of clarity can be fatal 
for individuals and media outlets that misjudge an enemy’s 
interpretation of international law in an armed conflict.  
Because NATO gave multiple justifications for targeting 
the radio station, some of which were not speech-driven, it is 
important to provide one specific instance here to demonstrate that 
the United States and NATO still firmly believe that 
propagandists are targetable. In September 2016, the United States 
targeted and killed Wa'il Adil Hasan Salman al-Fayad, whom the 
 
79  23 April: NATO Defends TV Attack What Was done, What Was Said; All 
Friday's Developments at a Glance, GUARDIAN (Apr. 23, 1999, 1:38 PM), https://www.t
heguardian.com/world/1999/apr/23/balkans17. 
80  Of note is the fact that NATO later provided further justification for the 
bombing of the RTS, by stating that the communication equipment at the station was also 
being used to support the command, control, and communications network of the military. 
Under international law, civilian objects being used for a military purpose are lawful targets 
in an armed conflict. Final Report to the Prosecutor by the committee Established to 
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
ICTY Doc. PR/P.I.S./510-E, 39 I.L.M. 1257, ¶ 1, 76 (June 13, 2000) [hereinafter ICTY 
Final Report Yugoslavia]. 
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Pentagon described as ISIL’s “Minister of Information.”81 This 
strike is noteworthy because there is no evidence that Fayad 
committed any action-driven attacks that would otherwise make 
him targetable.82 Furthermore, Fayad was not part of a larger strike 
against senior ISIL members; he was targeted in isolation while 
riding a motorcycle.83 While no statement by the United States 
mentions speech-driven targeting, the details of this strike make 
clear that United States’ practice supports the position that speech-
driven targeting of propagandists is lawful. 
Despite this position by the United States, it is difficult to 
justify how targeting propagandists meets the criteria established 
for speech-driven targeting. While NATO and the United States 
seem to arrive at the correct conclusion that there is a military 
advantage from targeting propagandists, any justification for 
targeting propagandists fails the distinction requirement. The 
analysis fails the distinction requirement based on both the 
ICRC’s position that the act be one casual step away from the 
harm, and the United States’ position that the act be the proximate, 
or but-for cause, of the harm. Under either interpretation, it is 
difficult to argue that the actions of propagandists are sufficiently 
connected to hostilities or responsible for harm from attacks to be 
considered as participating in hostilities.84 It is important to note 
that there is an distinct line between propaganda and directly 
inciting violence. If the latter is occurring, then the action is no 
longer propaganda and is likely targetable. However, as the ICTY 
stated in their Final Report to the NATO bombing in Yugoslavia, 
“[i]f the media is used to incite crimes, as in Rwanda, then it is a 
legitimate target. If it is merely disseminating propaganda to 
generate support for the war effort, it is not a legitimate target.”85 
 
81  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary 
Peter Cook on Airstrike Against ISIL Senior Leader (Sept. 16, 2015) https://www.defens
e.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/946983/statement-from-pentagon-press-
secretary-peter-cook-on-airstrike-against-isil-se/. 
82  Id.  
83  Barbara Starr & Ryan Browne, US Says it Killed New ISIS Information Minister 
in Drone Strike, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/16/politics/drone-
strike-isis-minister-information/.  
84  In assessing whether an action constitutes DPH the DoD Law of War Manual 
lists, “degree to which the act is connected to hostilities” and “the degree to which the act 
causes harm” and factors that should be considered. LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, 
¶ 5.8.3. 
85  ICTY Final Report Yugoslavia ¶ 47. 
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Because propaganda influences and manipulates behavior in a 
general way, as opposed to specific actions, it is difficult to justify 
how propaganda can meet the requirements for an imminent-
attack under a speech-driven targeting analysis.  
Some would counter this position with the argument that 
propagandists are targetable, not because of their specific actions, 
but because of their membership in an organized armed group. 
This argument fails, however, because of the requirements 
established in Part I of this article. Part I specifically established 
that membership in an organized armed group could be achieved 
by speech only if an individual declared membership and engaged 
in speech that constituted an imminent attack. Therefore, despite 
long-standing historical practice, a speech-driven targeting 
analysis would mean that propagandists are not a lawful target 
under current United States’ guidance and practice, because 
propaganda cannot be classified as an imminent attack, due to its 
lack of specificity. 
B. Planners and Leaders 
Planners and leaders of militaries and organized armed 
groups often do not engage in hostilities personally, but rather 
direct others to do so. This tactical direction and conduct-based 
behavior is often the foundation of state targeting decisions, and 
the correct analysis under the speech-driven standards defined in 
Part I of this article. An uncontroversial example of state practice 
in this area is the U.S. strike on Osama bin-Laden in 2011. Bin-
Laden was clearly a leader and member of al-Qaeda as well as a 
tactical level planner of attacks against the United States.86 It can 
be argued that his speech formed the initial conduct that 
transformed bin-Laden from a civilian to a lawful target, but once 
his speech made him a lawful status-based target, he remained so 
until the ultimate strike. Although the United States did not 
reference a speech-driven standard in targeting bin-Laden, they 
did use the two-step process outlined by Part I. The United States 
followed this process by first identifying speech that constituted 
an imminent attack under conduct-based targeting, and then used 
 
86  United States of America, The Death of Osama bin Laden, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-america-death-osama-bin-
laden (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
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that speech to support a more permanent status-based targeting 
justification from 2001 until the strike in 2011.87  
This analysis that bin-Laden never stopped being a status-
based target is supported by the statements released immediately 
following the death of bin-Laden. Five days after the raid that 
killed bin-Laden, a Pentagon official told the press corps that bin-
Laden “remained an active leader in al-Qaida, providing strategic, 
operational, and tactical instructions to the group . . . He was far 
from a figurehead [and] continued to direct even tactical details of 
the group’s management and to encourage plotting.”88 This 
official statement, and others at the time of bin-Laden’s death, 
clearly demonstrate that the United States was not relying solely 
on bin-Laden’s verbal declaration of membership in al-Qaeda as 
a basis of targeting. The statement also indicates that the United 
States relied on the fact that bin-Laden was giving tactical 
directions to members of the group to form the basis of the speech-
driven targeting. By analyzing the statements following the death 
of bin-Laden, it is clear that the United States relied on the speech-
driven analysis outlined in Part I to form the basis for targeting. 
While other cases like bin-Laden provide clear examples where 
the imminence standard is satisfied, a more recent case shows the 
tension in the imminent attack standard under speech-driven 
targeting. 
In January of 2020, the United States carried out a strike 
against Qasem Soleimani because he “was actively developing 
plans to attack American diplomats and service members in Iraq 
and throughout the region.”89 Using this statement as the basis for 
the strike, it is clear that the United States’ legal basis centered on 
the fact that General Soleimani was, via speech, directing 
imminent attacks against the United States. In speaking about the 
justification for the strike, at no point did the United States 
explicitly state that the strike on Soleimani was based on a speech-
 
87  President Barack Obama, Address at the White House: Osama Bin Laden Dead 
(May 2, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-
dead. 
88  United States of America the Death of Osama bin Laden, INT’L COMM. OF THE 
RED CROSS, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/united-states-america-death-osama-bin-
laden (last visited Apr. 6, 2021). 
89  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement by the Department of Defense 
(Jan. 2, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2049534/st
atement-by-the-department-of-defense/. 
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driven standard. Despite this, in reviewing the facts and 
justifications behind the strike, a convincing case emerges that a 
speech-driven analysis provides the best foundation for justifying 
the strike. The strike against Soleimani has drawn sharp critique 
in the international community for lack of justification under 
international law.90 The purpose of this article is not to debate the 
different justifications, but rather demonstrate how this strike 
could be justified from a speech-driven perspective.  
If a speech-driven analysis is applied to Soleimani as a 
planner, it is clear that his alleged actions in verbally directing 
others to attack the United States could satisfy the requirement 
that targetable speech constitutes an imminent attack, exclusive of 
their status in a military.91 Much of the critique surrounding the 
Soleimani strike, however, centers on the fact that even if he were 
planning actions against the United States, the actions were 
neither imminent nor rose to the necessary levels to constitute an 
attack. These critiques, while perhaps valid, are meaningless 
because there is no rule for what constitutes imminence under 
speech-driven targeting. 
While the exact definition of the imminence standard used 
in the speech-driven strike on Soleimani is an unsettled area of the 
law, the strike provides a valuable case study on how speech-
driven targeting can be used to justify strikes on individuals based 
on their conduct, via speech, exclusive of their status in a military. 
Nowhere in the statement justifying the strike does the United 
States ever claim that Iran was planning to attack. Rather 
Soleimani, as an individual, was “developing plans to attack.”92 If 
the United States was able to use a speech-driven targeting test 
that focused on Soleimani’s verbal actions in planning attacks, the 
United States could establish a legal basis for targeting him as an 
individual without entangling his actions with the state of Iran, or 
his status as an Iranian general. By doing this, the United States 
 
90  Agnes Callamard, The Targeted Killing of General Soleimani: Its Lawfulness 
and Why it Matters, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/67949/th
e-targeted-killing-of-general-soleimani-its-lawfulness-and-why-it-matters/. 
91  There has also been critique of the strike claiming that there was insufficient 
evidence to show that Soleimani was planning imminent attacks. Again, the purpose of this 
Article is not to dispute the facts, but analyze how the facts, as presented by a government, 
could justify a strike based on a speech-driven standard.  
92  DoD Statement, supra note 89. 
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could make an argument that the basis of the strike was not actions 
by Iran, but rather speech by Qasem Soleimani. Because 
Soleimani’s speech makes him targetable as an individual, this 
could have, in theory, precluded retaliatory action by Iran. 
If States can target individuals like Soleimani based on 
speech and divorce the speech of individuals from the actions of 
States, this would have a limiting effect on the retaliatory actions 
States can take, thereby limiting conflict and violence. In the case 
of Soleimani, the United States was very careful in its language 
justifying the strike not to tie Soleimani’s actions to Iran.93 If this 
interpretation were the norm in the case of Soleimani, Iran would 
have been forced to make a difficult choice. Either take 
responsibility for Soleimani’s speech in planning imminent 
attacks on the United States and incur liability as a State or refuse 
to adopt Soleimani’s speech and allow the United States to take 
action against Soleimani as an individual. However, in order to 
have these discussions, there must be an agreement as to what 
speech constitutes an imminent attack. In analyzing propagandists 
and planners as categories of speakers, a lack of consistent 
definition as to imminence is inhibiting the development of a rule 
in the context of speech-driven targeting. 
C. Recruiters and Trainers 
The final category of individuals who are regularly 
targeted based on speech are those individuals who recruit or train 
civilians to take part in hostilities. Recruitment and training are 
tasks that have historically been essential to armed conflicts. 
However, in the information age, recruiting and training are 
dominated by speech as opposed to action. Much of this speech 
takes place online through platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, 
Tumblr, Telegram, Facebook, or a myriad of other online 
platforms.94 Because much of this recruiting and training takes 
place online, it is pure speech with no tangible action outside of 
 
93  Id. 
94  An Update on our Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism, TWITTER (Aug. 18, 
2016), https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-
violent-extremism.html; Dhiraj Murthy, Evaluating Platform Accountability: Terrorist 
Content on YouTube, 65 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 800, 800–24 (2021); Rebecca Tan, 
Terrorists’ Love for Telegram Explained, VOX (June 30, 2017), https://www.vox.com/wo
rld/2017/6/30/15886506/terrorism-isis-telegram-social-media-russia-pavel-durov-twitter. 
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the digital world.95 This isolation of speech is invaluable in the 
discussion of speech-driven targeting.  
One of the most infamous online recruiters was the 
American born al-Qaeda recruiter and trainer, Anwar al-Awlaki. 
Awlaki’s case is unique for several reasons. For the discussion at 
hand, Awlaki is unique because he was exclusively a verbal 
participant in hostilities. All official statements and positions by 
the United States concerning Awlaki agree that he was a verbal 
participant in hostilities who “repeatedly called on individuals to 
kill innocent men, women, and children to advance the murderous 
agenda.”96 Based on Awlaki’s speech, he was targeted and killed 
by a United States drone strike in September 2011.  
As established by Part I, even though Awlaki proclaimed 
membership in al-Qaeda, this speech alone cannot establish 
status-based targeting. Instead, there must first be an 
accompanying conduct-based foundation. Legal opinions by the 
United States DoJ written to justify the targeting of Awlaki 
support this conclusion. In 2010, David Barron, the Acting 
Assistant Attorney General, wrote, “the targeted person [Awlaki] 
is part of a dangerous enemy force [al-Qaeda] and is engaged in 
activities that pose a continued and imminent threat to U.S. 
persons or interests.”97 By acknowledging the conjunctive nature 
of Awlaki’s activities conducted via speech, United States’ 
practice, through the DoJ memo, is tacitly endorsing the two-step 
process outlined in Part I. 
While the Awlaki case again confirms this two-part test 
that Part I set forth, it also brings the debate back to the question 
of imminence. Awlaki was dangerous because he motivated and 
recruited others to join al-Qaeda and eventually carry out 
attacks.98 In this role Awlaki acted as (1) a general propagandist 
 
95  Id. 
96  Obama, supra note 1.  
97  While the use of both bases could simply be the U.S. government building a 
case to the American people and not reflective of the legal or policy requirement to target 
Awlaki, it is an official statement that, without contradiction, will translate into state 
practice. Memorandum from David J. Barron to the U.S. Att’y Gen., Applicability of 
Federal Criminal Law and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against 
Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Awlaki DoJ Memo]. 
98  How Dangerous Is Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/31/how-dangerous-is-anwar-al-awlaki; 
See also Glenn Greenwald, Criminalizing Free Speech, SALON (June 1, 2011), 
https://www.salon.com/control/2011/06/01/free_speech_4/. 
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for al-Qaeda by making videos and sermons justifying jihad 
against the West in the context of Islam, (2) a recruiter for al-
Qaeda for encouraging faithful Muslims to join in jihad against 
America, and (3) as a spiritual trainer helping specific individuals 
justify their missions. Was Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter and 
trainer sufficient to justify an imminent attack under conduct-
based standards? While the United States would claim that his 
actions were sufficient, many scholars and States would 
disagree.99 
The dispute about what constitutes direct participation 
under the definition of imminence in action-driven targeting is a 
constant that many scholars and States have accepted as the 
norm.100 However, this is unacceptable in a speech-driven 
targeting context. Not only is the freedom of speech a universal 
human right in international law, the United States has also 
characterized First Amendment principles as a universal human 
right.101 Allowing a nebulous standard to exist around speech-
driven targeting undermines speech’s importance from both the 
international and United States perspective. A more precise rule-
based standard is necessary. Creating a rule that defines 
imminence and sets forth procedural guidelines will allow 
individuals to clearly understand the limits of free speech and 
enhance the uniform application of free speech standards under 
international law. Part III will develop a model rule for speech-
driven targeting to achieve these goals. 
III. DEVELOPING THE TEST’S FACTORS 
Part II established that speech-driven targeting is 
practiced by States and accepted by international law 
commentators. Despite this well-accepted practice, the 
examination of speech-driven targeting also revealed that States 
and scholars do not agree on the limits of speech-driven targeting 
 
99  NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 
(2009). 
100  Michael Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct 
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 5, 14–15 (2010). 
101  Historically the U.S. has characterized the First Amendment as a universal 
human right. Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech At - And 
Beyond - Our Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1549 (2010); G.A. Res. 217(III) A, 
supra note 74, at 19.  
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or on a common set of definitional guidelines. In order to remedy 
this gap in international law, Part III will normatively define the 
factors that should be used in speech-driven targeting. Preeminent 
international law scholars, Abram Chayes and Thomas Ehrlich, 
have posited that international law can affect international policy 
in three ways: (1) as a constraint on policy, (2) as a justification 
for policy, and (3) as an organizational structure for policy 
decisions.102 Adapting these conclusions to speech-driven 
targeting shows that developing clear factors for speech-driven 
targeting decisions will provide three core advantages: (1) serving 
as a substantive constraint on the ability to use lethal force in 
response to speech, (2) justifying the use of force against speech 
without violating the rights associated with free speech, and (3) 
organizing decision-makers’ actions in a manner that provides 
consistent policy decisions when targeting speech. By using clear 
factors, speech-driven targeting decisions would no longer consist 
of nebulous legal or policy standards, but more precise legal rules, 
that allow better decisions by both states and speakers.  
In order to develop a more precise rules-based 
application, Part III will propose three factors for use in speech-
driven targeting decisions. These factors are adapted from United 
States First Amendment case law because when speech-driven 
strikes are conducted in a manner divorced from First Amendment 
standards, there is an argument to be made that the United States 
is conducting strikes in an unconstitutional manner. Further, 
because the United States has a large body of First Amendment 
case law there is a large body of jurisprudence to draw upon for 
guidance. Although the focus of this article is on United States 
policy and law, because freedom of speech is a universal human 
right recognized by the UN, the three proposed factors have been 
developed in such a way that they are adaptable to any liberal 
interpretation of free speech rights.  
A. Possible First Amendment Violations 
The focus of this article is not on domestic and foreign 
applications of First Amendment case law to United States 
citizens and non-citizens. There is a rich debate among scholars 
 
102  Chayes, Supra note 7. 
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on this topic that is beyond the scope of this article.103 Despite this, 
a brief discussion of how the First Amendment might apply to 
targeting decisions outside of the United States is required. This 
discussion is necessary to understand why speech-driven targeting 
decisions, regardless of location or nationality of the target, should 
be moored in First Amendment standards. While the First 
Amendment usually applies to actions by the government inside 
the United States, an argument exists that the First Amendment 
applies extraterritorially if: (1) a United States citizen is 
conducting the speech104 or (2) a United States citizen is 
consuming the speech105 and (3) the United States government is 
acting as a sovereign regulator (e.g., the government is taking 
action against the speech).106 If condition (1) or (2) exists, and is 
accompanied by condition (3), then the First Amendment 
arguably applies, and there should be heightened scrutiny 
regarding the targeting. 
These restrictions would be substantially diminished if 
the targeted speech fell into a category of speech that was 
“unprotected” by the First Amendment, such as fighting words, 
incitement, true threats, or solicitations to commit crimes. Current 
state practice, although vague and ill-defined, best aligns with the 
First Amendment body of law defining incitement to commit 
imminent lawless action. Understanding how the First 
Amendment arguably applies to United States targeting, and how 
certain forms of speech are “unprotected,” helps develop targeting 
criteria that would be supported by IHL, as well as United States 
laws and policy regarding the freedom of speech. 
1. Is a United States citizen conducting the 
speech? — The protections and ideals enshrined in the First 
 
103  For an excellent discussion on how the First Amendment applies abroad see 
Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 259, 287 (2009) (arguing that First Amendment protections may apply abroad 
depending on factors like “where the speech originated, where its intended audience was, 
and the location of detention and trial.”). Compare id., with Kermit Roosevelt, 
Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2066 
(2005) (expressing doubt that communications abroad are protected under traditional First 
Amendment justifications). 
104  Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308 (1981); Zick, supra note 101, at 1549; Reid v. 
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
105  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). 
106  Conduct by a government official is, as a general rule, government action if it 
is related to the official's governmental duties. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 54 (1988). 
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Amendment are at the zenith of their power when the United 
States government acts against a United States citizen speaking to 
United States citizens inside the United States. As the speaker, 
listener, and location of the speech move outside the borders of 
the United States, the constitutional protections diminish, but they 
never entirely disappear.107 Action against a person conducting 
targetable speech inside the United States falls under the 
jurisdiction of domestic law, and the analysis would take place 
under a law enforcement paradigm and International Human 
Rights Law, and is beyond the scope of this article. For this reason, 
the analysis of First Amendment protections begins with speech-
driven targeting of a United States citizen speaking beyond the 
borders of the United States. 
If a United States citizen is conducting the speech, then 
the First Amendment may apply, regardless of the speaker’s 
location.108 The location is arguably irrelevant because the United 
States Supreme Court has largely rejected the idea that “when the 
United States acts against citizens abroad it can do so free of 
the Bill of Rights.”109 Furthermore, the Court has specifically held 
that other constitutional rights, including the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Sixth Amendments apply to United States citizens, regardless of 
location.110 Therefore, when the United States targets a United 
States citizen like Awlaki, case law supports the argument that the 
First Amendment, and its associated protections, would apply. 
Because the First Amendment arguably applies, any speech-
driven targeting divorced of a First Amendment analysis could 
result in a Constitutional violation of free speech.  
 
107  Haig, 453 U.S. at 308; Zick, supra note 101, at 1549. 
108  Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a 
More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 944–46 (2011); compare Gerald L. 
Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2076–77 (2005), with Kermit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the 
Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 2066 (2005). Some 
commentators view the Constitution itself as a social compact with an extensive 
extraterritorial reach. They would presumably support a more robust extraterritorial First 
Amendment. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: 
Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985). 
109  Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. 
110  DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST U.S. 
CITIZEN, supra note 3, at 5 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality 
opinion)); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269–70 (1990); see also, In 
re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 170 n.7 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
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2. Is a United States citizen consuming the 
speech? — Even if the speaker is not a United States citizen, if a 
United States citizen is the consumer of the speech, some First 
Amendment constraints could apply. These protections would still 
apply because the First Amendment exists not only to protect 
speakers, but also to protect the free flow of speech within the 
marketplace of ideas.111 First Amendment protections extend to 
speech consumption as well as production.112 Because the First 
Amendment protects both United States speakers and United 
States consumers of speech, if the United States government acts 
to limit the speech available to United States citizens via speech-
driven targeting, First Amendment principles may apply.113 
The Supreme Court has stated that “in a variety of 
contexts, this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to 
‘receive information and ideas.’”114 Furthermore, the Court has 
held that this right is transnational. Specifically, the Court has held 
that the First Amendment applies to the rights of United States 
citizens to exchange ideas with specific foreign speakers, as well 
as receive general information from foreign sources.115 This 
concept is of particular importance in the information age where 
American citizens can view videos posted on the internet by 
someone like bin-Laden, even if the videos are aimed at fighters 
in Afghanistan. The question of whether a single viewing by a 
United States citizen would be sufficient to trigger First 
Amendment standards is beyond the scope of the article. 
However, it is worth noting how far First Amendment standards 
could potentially extend based on current Supreme Court case 
jurisprudence. 
3. Is the United States government acting as a sovereign 
regulator? — Even though the First Amendment states, 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, 
[emphasis added]” the Supreme Court has applied the First 
Amendment to Executive Branch actions on numerous 
 
111  Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). 
112  Id. 
113  Zick, supra note 101, at 1549. 
114  Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 762. 
115  Id. (regarding exchanges with a specific individual); see also Lamont v. 
Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (regarding exchanges with foreign 
sources of information generally). 
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occasions.116 Deadly force, applied through speech-driven 
targeting is not the typical “governmental action” considered in 
most First Amendment cases. Regardless, under a First 
Amendment analysis, when the US government uses force against 
a speaker , the government is acting as a sovereign regulator, 
thereby satisfying the third and final prong to trigger First 
Amendment standards.  
4. Is the speech protected? — Even though the First 
Amendment could apply to a wide range of scenarios, targeting 
restrictions imposed by the First Amendment principles would 
only apply if the speech were in a protected sub-class. While the 
First Amendment protects speech, it also recognizes that not all 
speech is equal and grants varying levels of protection to different 
forms of speech. In deciding what is considered unprotected 
speech, case law has distinguished between speech that presents a 
danger in the abstract, as opposed to speech which presents an 
imminent danger. 117 As speech becomes more likely to present a 
tangible threat of violence, the protections diminish.118 In this 
regard, the First Amendment analysis is not dissimilar to the 
analysis in Part I, where it was established that only speech 
constituting an imminent attack could form the basis of speech-
driven targeting. Part I also established, however, that speech-
driven targeting lacked any meaningful standard of imminence. 
By mooring definitional standards of imminence in accepted First 
Amendment case law, vague concepts used in speech-driven 
targeting decisions such as “imminent threat” assume a 
meaningful definition that can be used in speech-driven targeting 
decisions.119 
 
116  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1047 
(W.D. Wis. 2010) (citing United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 465 
(1995)), rev’d, 641 F.3d 803 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) 
(per curiam); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 305, (1965); see 
also McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 877 (2005); Sch. 
Dist. of Abington Township, Penn. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
117  While the Supreme Court has held that political and ideological speech can be 
regulated by the government, it came to the same conclusions as Part I, noting that US law 
does not “penalize mere association, but prohibits the act of giving foreign terrorist groups 
material support.” Holder, 561 U.S. at 6.  
118  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
119  Note that “imminent threat” was the language the Obama administration used 
to justify the targeting of Awlaki. DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL 
OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN, supra note 3. 
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While there is an argument to be made that the First 
Amendment applies extraterritorially to targeting decisions, no 
court decision or United States policy has ever explicitly stated 
that this is the case. Thus, it is possible that First Amendment 
protections do not apply in some or all of the scenarios discussed 
above. However, even if the First Amendment does not apply 
directly, there are two compelling reasons why the United States 
should still comply with First Amendment principles 
extraterritorially. First, “the United States has historically 
characterized and sought to position the First Amendment as a 
universal human right.”120 Second, the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognizes the “right to freedom of opinion and 
expression.”121 Therefore, mooring speech-driven targeting 
principles to the principles of freedom of speech and expression is 
appropriate regardless of whether Constitutional protections 
strictly apply.  
B. Proposed Factors for Speech-Driven Targeting 
The First Amendment is a valuable starting point for 
establishing what kinds of speech constitute lawful targets under 
an imminent threat standard. 122 However, the First Amendment 
exists for domestic applications in times of peace and must be 
modified slightly for applicability in armed conflicts abroad. The 
best First Amendment test to apply in assessing “imminent threat” 
is the Brandenburg test for incitement. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
the United States Supreme Court articulated a three-pronged test 
to determine whether speech fell outside of First Amendment 
protection.123 To lose protection, the Court held that the speech 
must consist of language directed to incite or produce imminent 
lawless action and it must be likely to incite such action.124 
The three factors used to determine whether the speech is 
unprotected are: (1) the likelihood that the lawless action would 
occur, (2) whether there was intent to incite lawless action, and 
 
120  Zick, supra note 101, at 1549. 
121  G.A. Res. 217(III) A, supra note 74. 
122  Note that “imminent threat” was the language the Obama administration used 
to justify the targeting of Awlaki. DOJ WHITE PAPER ON LAWFULNESS OF LETHAL 
OPERATION AGAINST U.S. CITIZEN, supra note 3. 
123  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.  
124  Id. at 447.  
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(3) whether the speech called for imminent lawless action.125 
These Brandenburg factors are similar to those in IHL guidance 
on when a civilian has lost their protected status by directly 
participating in hostilities (DPH). In assessing whether a civilian’s 
actions constitute DPH, and justify targeting, United States 
guidance on IHL uses a non-exhaustive list of factors as guidance. 
The following three US factors in particular find parity in the 
Brandenburg standard: (1) is the act likely to adversely affect a 
party to the conflict, (2) is the act intended to advance the war 
aims of a party to the conflict, and (3) is the act the proximate 
cause of the attack. This article proposes a modification of the 
Brandenburg factors for jus in bello application, as follows: (1) 
the likelihood that the speech will cause an attack to occur; (2) 
whether there was intent to incite an attack; and (3) whether the 
speech called for an imminent attack. These three modified factors 
from Brandenburg provide a metric for assessing what speech is 
targetable. 
1. Is the speech likely to cause an attack? — The first 
factor in assessing whether an individual has participated in 
hostilities is whether or not their actions meet the “threshold of 
harm.” In providing clarity to this factor, the DoD Law of War 
Manual states that threshold of harm is determined by, “the degree 
to which the act is likely to adversely affect the military operations 
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict.”126 This 
requirement finds parity in the Brandenburg likelihood factor, 
which measures whether the speech is “likely to incite or produce 
lawless action.”127 Both of these tests emphasize how likely the 
action or speech is to bring about a violent act. The more likely 
the speech is to cause an attack, the more imminent the danger, 
and the less protected the speech. In this respect, the Brandenburg 
likelihood factors finds parity and provides guidance to the IHL 
factors for speech-driven targeting. 
In Brandenburg, the words in question were uttered by a 
Ku Klux Klan (KKK) leader who encouraged violence against 
Black and Jewish people and urged the taking back of states’ 
rights by force. In protecting the KKK leader’s words, the Court 
 
125  Id.  
126  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3. 
127  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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found the likelihood of incitement was low and that, “a mere 
abstract teaching . . . for a resort to force and violence, is not the 
same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such 
action.”128 Although Brandenburg’s words were reprehensible and 
inflammatory, the Court found that because they were abstract and 
general, they were unlikely to incite or produce lawless action. 
Applying this standard to speech-driven targeting would mean 
that before speech could be targeted it would have to be likely to 
produce an attack. 
In the context of an armed conflict, if an extremist leader 
were to generally encourage violence against American forces in 
Iraq and to take the Iraqi government back by force, the analysis 
from Brandenburg is insightful in deciding whether this speech is 
targetable. Under a Brandenburg analysis, the language in 
question is unlikely to produce an imminent attack because the 
speech is abstract and does not prepare a specific person or group 
for violent action against a particular target. As a result, the 
speaker would maintain their protected civilian status, just as the 
Court found the speech to be protected in Brandenburg. 
In contrast to the exercise of speech noted above, if 
Brandenburg or the extremist leader had gone beyond advocacy 
and been more direct, the likelihood of violence would have 
increased. As the likelihood of violence increases, so does the 
imminence of an attack. In determining the line between protected 
and unprotected speech, Brandenburg states that the more specific 
the language is in preparing a group for an attack the more 
imminent the threat.129 In the above example of the extremist 
leader, his speech would fall outside Brandenburg’s standards and 
only become targetable if the leader made specific calls for 
violence against specific targets. Language that could make the 
speech targetable could include directing particular followers to 
attack at a certain time, location, or against specific units or 
individuals. Thus, Brandenburg is instructive in considering how 
likely an attack is and provides granularity in defining likelihood. 
Regardless of how likely an attack is to occur based on speech, 
there must also be an assessment of whether the speaker intended 
to incite an attack. If the speaker was merely careless and did not 
 
128  Id. at 448. 
129  Id.  
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intend to incite an attack, then it is unlikely that the speaker 
possesses the requisite intent to be considered a lawful target. 
2. Is the speech intended to incite an 
attack? — According to Brandenburg, not only must the speech 
be likely to produce lawless action, but the speech must also be 
intended to produce lawless action.130 The DoD Law of War 
Manual contains a similar requirement, stating there should be an 
assessment of the “specific purpose underlying the act, such as, 
whether the activity is intended to advance the war aims of one 
party [emphasis added].”131 With the DoD Law of War Manual’s 
intent requirement in mind, the Brandenburg standard provides 
amplifying guidance in line with state practice. 
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court provided 
clarification to Brandenburg’s intent standard in Texas v. 
Johnson.132 In Johnson, a man was convicted of burning the 
American flag at a political rally while onlookers chanted, 
“America, the red, white, and blue, we spit on you.”133 In 
overturning the conviction and clarifying the intent prong of 
Brandenburg, the Court held that not only must the speech be 
likely to cause violence, but that the speaker must also intend to 
cause violence. Specifically, the Court stated,  
We have not permitted the government to assume 
that every expression of a provocative idea will 
incite a riot, but have instead required careful 
consideration of the actual circumstances 
surrounding such expression, asking whether the 
expression is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action . . . . To accept Texas’ 
arguments that it need only demonstrate “the 
potential for a breach of the peace . . . would be 
to eviscerate our holding in Brandenburg. This 
we decline to do.134 
Reading the holding in Johnson in conjunction with jus in bello 
standards in order to comply with First Amendment protections, a 
 
130  Id. at 447. 
131  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3. 
132  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
133  Id. at 399.  
134  Id. at 409 (quotations and citations omitted). 
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speech-driven targeting test would require that the speaker 
demonstrate an intent to incite an attack. 
For example, if during an armed conflict, an Afghan 
civilian burned an American flag, this speech would not be 
targetable. Even if disparaging language towards United States 
troops accompanied the burning of the flag, the speech is protected 
by both a First Amendment and jus in bello analysis. Furthermore, 
even if the act of burning the flag emboldened others to attack 
American troops, the flag burning in isolation demonstrates 
insufficient intent to be targetable speech. On the other hand, if 
specific calls for violence accompanied the flag burning, the 
speech expressed by burning the flag would be targetable. 
Johnson, clarifies that not only must an attack be likely, but the 
speaker must also intend for an attack to occur.135  
The first two factors focus on how likely the speech is to 
cause an attack, and whether the speaker intended to cause an 
attack. First Amendment case law, however, requires a third factor 
be present before speech is considered unprotected. The speech 
must be linked to the lawlessness or attack in some way. This final 
factor again finds parity in First Amendment case law and IHL. 
3. Does the speech call for an imminent attack? — Under 
traditional targeting standards, in order to decide what actions 
constitute an imminent threat and warrant targeting under DPH 
standards, the United States looks at whether an action is the 
proximate cause of an attack. In assessing whether an act meets 
this standard, the DoD Law of War Manual states that an act must 
be “the proximate or ‘but for’ cause of death, injury, or damage to 
persons or objects belonging to an opposing party.”136 This 
language, requiring a proximate causal link, mirrors the imminent 
lawlessness factor from the Brandenburg test.137 
The Court clarified the imminence prong of the 
Brandenburg test in the 1973 case Hess v. Indiana. In Hess, after 
the police forcibly removed the defendant and other protestors 
from the street, Hess yelled, “we'll take the [expletive] street 
later.”138 In protecting the speech, the Court held that “there was 
 
135  Id. 
136  LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 8, ¶ 5.8.3. 
137  Martha A. Field, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Justice Breyer, 
Dissenting, 128 HARV. L. REV. 434, 442 (2014). 
138  Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (per curiam).  
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no evidence that [Hess’ words were] . . . likely to produce 
imminent disorder.”139 Because Hess’ speech was not directed at 
a specific person or group of persons and only advocated illegal 
action at some indefinite time, the speech remained within First 
Amendment protections.140 
Similarly, in 2015, members of the Islamic State Hacking 
Division posted a list of Americans working in the military and 
government, stating that the information was provided “to the 
soldiers of the khilafah [caliphate], who soon with the permission 
of Allah will strike at your necks in your own lands!”141 Although 
the group called for action by soldiers of the caliphate, they were 
not speaking to an actual group of individuals, but rather a 
notional group of radicalized individuals in the West. 
Furthermore, the call for action was not accompanied by specifics. 
Much like Hess’ use of the words “take the street later,” 
the verbiage, “soon will strike,” is a “the mere abstract teaching 
[and] is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and 
steeling it to such action.”142 While this speech is close to being 
targetable, because it is not directed towards a specific action or a 
specific group, it is too many casual steps removed to be deemed 
the proximate cause of an attack. A would-be attacker would have 
to find the list online, locate individuals on the list, plan an attack, 
then commit an attack. Thus, there are too many intervening steps 
to make the posting of the list the proximate cause or “but for” 
cause of the attack. Therefore, the speech would not represent an 
imminent attack and would not be targetable. 
However, if the group had communicated the list of 
names to specific individuals and provided instructions for people 
on the list to be attacked, the hackers would have demonstrated a 
clear intent to incite an imminent attack. By calling on specific 
individuals the hacker’s speech would be “preparing a group for 
violent action and steeling it to such action,”143 and the hackers 
would become lawful targets. However, without this specificity in 
 
139  Hess, 414 U.S. at 109. 
140  Id.  
141  Dugald McConnell & Brian Todd, Purported ISIS Militants Post List of 1,400 
U.S. ‘Targets,’ CNN (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/13/world/isis-
militants-american-targets/index.html. 
142  Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448. 
143  Id.  
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the hacker’s language, United States guidance on IHL, coupled 
with amplification from Brandenburg and Hess, demonstrates that 
this kind of speech would not be targetable. 
4. Utilization of the factors beyond United States 
standards. — In developing the factors above, alternative 
interpretations from commentators such as the ICRC were 
considered, but United States interpretation of IHL were used 
exclusively for the analysis. This exclusive use of United States 
standards, however, should not be interpreted to mean that 
standards proposed by this article would only apply to United 
States interpretations of IHL. Although every State has unique 
interpretations of IHL, there is consensus that IHL principles 
apply in an armed conflict, specifically the Geneva Conventions 
and the sections of the Additional Protocols that are considered 
customary international law.144 Therefore, the differences are not 
in the foundational standards of IHL, but rather differences in 
interpreting those foundational standards. Because the differences 
are based in interpretation, as opposed to standards, this means 
that the guidelines developed above could apply to a wide variety 
of interpretations of IHL. 
To demonstrate how these factors could apply to various 
interpretations of IHL, it is useful to apply the ICRC's factors for 
DPH to the factors developed above. In determining whether an 
individual's actions constituted DPH, the ICRC uses three factors: 
(1) the likelihood that the act will adversely affect the enemy's 
military capacity, (2) whether there is a direct causal link between 
the action and the harm, and (3) whether the act is specifically 
intended to cause the required threshold of harm.145 Despite the 
slight differences between the ICRC and United States factors, it 
is apparent that the ICRC factors also find parity in the speech-
driven standards developed above. This shared parity means that 
the ICRC’s targeting factors could be translated into the same 
three factors developed for United States targeting. 
While these three factors developed for the ICRC would 
be identical in language to those developed for the United States, 
 
144  ARMED CONFLICT DESKBOOK, supra note 26, at 7–8, 21 (2016).  
145  NELS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON 
THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 
(2009). 
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the ICRC could interpret the factors differently to provide the 
higher level of protection desired by ICRC standards. In 
particular, the second factor requiring the speech to call for an 
"imminent attack" could be narrowly interpreted to meet the ICRC 
standard of direct causation. To satisfy this narrow interpretation, 
the ICRC, and States more aligned with the ICRC's interpretation, 
could require speech to directly cause an attack before it could be 
targeted. For example, under an ICRC interpretation, an 
individual would have to directly order someone to attack before 
the imminence standard would be satisfied. In this manner, the 
factors developed by this article could be applied to a wide variety 
of interpretations of IHL, while still providing enhanced guidance 
to speech-driven targeting. 
As with any normative approach that attempts to 
transform a nebulous standard into a robust factor-based rule, 
there is the critique that it unnecessarily constrains States’ ability 
to use force in a timely manner and, degrades the jus ad bellum 
inherent right to self-defense. While a valid critique, this is a trade 
that liberal societies like the United States must accept and have 
accepted in the past in the area of free speech. The duty of the law 
is “to patrol the fine line between vital national security concerns 
and forbidden encroachments on constitutionally protected 
freedom of speech.”146 Without clear rules-based parameters, the 
law cannot patrol this line. While there are drawbacks to a more 
rigid rules-based standard, the benefits of protecting speech and 
providing clear guidelines will lead to more coherent and uniform 
decisions when States choose to target speech. 
IV. APPLYING THE ENHANCED FACTORS 
Part IV applies the factors outlined in Part II to the real-
world case of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American Muslim cleric and 
a self-proclaimed leader in al-Qaeda on the Arab Peninsula 
(AQAP).147 Awlaki’s case is important for several reasons. First, 
because Awlaki was a United States citizen, there was a 
heightened sense of scrutiny surrounding his strike, producing a 
 
146  United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2013). 
147  Obama, supra note 1; Anwar al-Awlaki Ties to Extremists, COUNTER 
EXTREMISM PROJECT, https://www.counterextremism.com/anwar-al-awlaki (last visited 
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plethora of declassified documents to analyze. Second, there is no 
evidence that Awlaki participated in hostilities via traditional 
action-based means; all of his participation was via speech. 
Finally, Awlaki was a prolific speaker who engaged in a wide 
range of rhetoric, which allows for an analysis of his role as a 
propagandist, leader, and recruiter and trainer.148 This Part 
concludes that had the United States utilized the enhanced factors 
from Part III, the United States justification for the strike and 
international reaction would have been on ostensibly solid legal 
and policy grounds thereby engendering a more positive 
international reaction. Specifically, the use of the factors from Part 
III would have allowed the United States to justify targeting 
specific portions of Awlaki’s speech based on the category the 
speech fell into. This approach would have allowed the United 
States to articulate a more coherent rationale for targeting 
Awlaki’s speech. A more articulate and coherent rationale would 
have in turn, structured the international response and led to 
international discussion and acknowledgment of standards for 
targeting speech under international law. 
A. Nature of Awlaki’s Speech 
As noted, Awlaki was a prolific speaker. In order to 
systemically examine his various types of speech, the analysis will 
be limited to his speech conducted inside of Yemen from 2004-
2011. During this period, Awlaki’s speech can be placed into one 
of four categories. The first is declaratory speech, which he used 
to profess membership and secure a leadership role in AQAP.149 
The second is propaganda speech with which Awlaki generally 
preached inflammatory rhetoric aimed at the West.150 The third is 
Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter encouraging others to join 
AQAP.151 Finally, Awlaki also used speech to plan attacks against 
the United States.152 While President Obama cited all of the above 
reasons as the basis for the United States targeting Awlaki, he did 
 
148  Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), 
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not distinguish between them.153 For the purposes of the analysis 
each type of speech will be treated as a discrete category. In doing 
so, it becomes apparent that only Awlaki’s speech in planning 
attacks could serve as a lawful basis for targeting. 
B. Awlaki’s Declaratory Speech Proclaiming Status in AQAP 
On many occasions, Awlaki declared that he was a 
member and leader in AQAP. Because the United States is in a 
non-international armed conflict with al-Qaeda, Awlaki could be 
targeted as a member of an organized armed group under status-
based targeting. Part I, however, elucidated that status-based 
targeting cannot exist without a conduct-based foundation. 
Therefore, before Awlaki’s declaratory speech can form the basis 
for speech-driven targeting there must be a finding that some of 
his speech constituted an imminent attack. The United States 
found that Awlaki’s speech as a planner and organizer constituted 
an imminent attack. 
C. Awlaki’s Speech as a Propagandist 
During the nine years Awlaki spent in Yemen he 
produced countless sermons and lectures in written, audio, and 
video formats that were published via the internet. In these videos, 
Awlaki encouraged Muslims to attack the West and provided 
religious justifications for carrying out the attacks.154 His speech 
in this regard was nothing short of prolific. The Counter 
Extremism Project counted 99 “extremists” who had been 
influenced by Awlaki.155 Among these extremists are notorious 
individuals who either committed attacks or took substantial steps 
in preparation to do so. Notable individuals include the 7/7 
London bombers, the Toronto 18, the Fort Dix shooter, the 2009 
Little Rock recruiting office shooter, and the 2010 Times Square 
bomber.156 While these individuals cited Awlaki’s propaganda as 
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an inspiration, none of them had individual contact with Awlaki 
either in person or via the internet.157  
In deciding whether propagandist speech can form the 
basis for speech-driven targeting, the normative factors developed 
in Part III are instructive. In addressing the first factor of 
likeliness, there is a high likelihood that this kind of propaganda 
would result in attacks. Both the content of the speech, and the 
fact that numerous extremists cited Awlaki as a source of 
inspiration, serve to provide sufficient evidence to meet the first 
factor. 
Moving to the second factor of intent, it is also clear that 
Awlaki explicitly intended his propaganda to result in attacks. 
Awlaki used language such as “[d]on't consult with anybody in 
killing the Americans, fighting the devil doesn't require 
consultation or prayers seeking divine guidance. They are the 
party of the devils.”158 The intent of the propaganda is self-
evident, satisfying the second factor of the test. 
In examining the causation factor, however, it is clear that 
Awlaki’s propaganda was not the proximate cause of the attacks. 
In conducting this general propaganda, Awlaki did not 
specifically target the individuals who carried out the attacks. Nor 
did Awlaki’s propaganda provide these individuals with specific 
targets. Much like the language used in Hess (“we'll take the 
[expletive] street later”), Awlaki’s speech was inflammatory but 
insufficiently specific to constitute an imminent attack. There are 
too many intervening factors between Awlaki’s propaganda and 
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the attacks for the propaganda to be considered the proximate 
cause of the attacks. Due to these intervening factors, Awlaki’s 
propaganda cannot serve as the basis for his targeting and 
justification must be found elsewhere.  
D. Awlaki’s Speech as a Recruiter 
Awlaki also spoke individually to those he was trying to 
recruit or individuals who reached out to him. The most notorious 
of these individuals was the Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan. In 
the year leading up to the shooting Hasan and Awlaki exchanged 
as many as 18e-mails between December 2008 and June 2009.159 
Again, it is important to understand that these exchanges were not 
specific directions or coordination, but rather general recruitment. 
Prior to the attack Hasan praised Awlaki’s message and sought 
advice about topics such when jihad is warranted and when it is 
permissible to kill innocents in suicide attacks.160 In an interview 
to the Washington Post after the attack, Awlaki described himself 
as Hassan’s “confidant.”161 
The first two factors as to whether Awlaki’s speech as a 
recruiter is targetable are met, as Awlaki’s speech was likely to 
result in attack and was intended to result in attacks. This means 
that, the determinative factor is again whether Awlaki’s speech 
was the proximate “but for” cause of the attack. Setting aside the 
fact that Hasan initiated the contact, thus demonstrating a 
predisposition to carry out an attack, there still appears to be 
insufficient justification to support the assertion that Awlaki’s 
speech was the “but for” cause of the attack. 
This conclusion is supported by government findings both 
before and after the attack. The F.B.I was aware of and had access 
to Awlaki’s correspondence with Hasan before the attack, and in 
reviewing the language of the e-mails before the attack the F.B.I 
found that they “did not suggest any threat of violence and 
conclude[ed] that no further action was warranted.”162 Even after 
 
159  Brian Ross & Rhonda Schwartz, Major Hasan’s E-mail: ‘I Can’t Wait to Join 
You’ in Afterlife, ABC NEWS (Nov. 19, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/major-
hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/story?id=9130339. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. 
162  David Johnston & Scott Shane, U.S. Knew of Suspect’s Tie to Radical Cleric, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/us/10inquire.html. 
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the attack, with knowledge of the e-mails and the actual attack, the 
F.B.I. stated that “there is no information to indicate Major Nidal 
Malik Hasan had any co-conspirators or was part of a broader 
terrorist plot.”163 The conclusions of the F.B.I. in reviewing 
Awlaki’s speech are in line with the amplifying guidelines from 
Hess on proximate cause and imminence. Even though Awlaki 
personally addressed Hasan, Awlaki never suggested a time, date, 
location, or method of attack. While Awlaki recruited Hasan in 
general terms, Awlaki did not use speech to direct the attack, and 
the lack of specific direction from Awlaki to Hassan prevents 
Awlaki’s speech from being described as the proximate cause of 
the attack.164 Therefore, Awlaki’s speech as a recruiter cannot 
form the foundation for speech-driven targeting.  
E. Awlaki’s Speech as a Planner and Organizer 
Finally, Awlaki’s speech in his role as a planner and 
organizer within AQAP must be considered. Speaking 
immediately after the strike that killed Awlaki, President Obama 
cited two specific attacks that Awlaki planned and organized: a 
2010 transatlantic cargo bomb plot and a 2009 bomb plot to blow 
up a United States passenger plane.165 Little is known about 
Awlaki’s exact role in the 2010 plot, but in the 2009 plot, the 
bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was captured and 
interrogated by the F.B.I.166 During this interrogation, 
Abdulmutallab outlined specific conversations he had with 
Awlaki providing a tremendous level of detail about Awlaki’s 
involvement and in particular, the speech Awlaki utilized in 
organizing the attack.167 While large parts of the transcript remain 
classified, the publicly available portions provide a sufficient 
basis to justify the speech-driven targeting of Awlaki. 
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In describing Awlaki’s role in the bombing, 
Abdulmutallab made clear that someone other than Awlaki 
developed and presented the plan to him.168 Furthermore, someone 
other than Awlaki trained Abdulmutallab for the mission.169 While 
the planning and training that were conducted via speech would 
likely also be targetable, this section focuses on Awlaki’s speech. 
Regarding Awlaki’s specific role in the attack, Abdulmutallab 
stated that Awlaki “gave [him] final specific instructions: that the 
operation should be conducted on a U.S. airliner.”170 It is this 
interaction, conducted exclusively through speech, that makes 
Awlaki a lawful target. 
As before, the first two factors under the enhanced test are 
met in that Awlaki’s speech was both intended to result in an 
attack and, based on the training provided to Abdulmutallab, was 
likely to result in an attack. It is the level of specific direction that 
Awlaki provided, regarding the target of the attacks, that satisfy 
the definition of imminent and proximate “but for” cause under 
enhanced test standard. Because Awlaki’s words were directed at 
a particular individual and were specific, his speech must be seen 
as an imminent attack or the “but for” cause of the attack that 
Abdulmutallab intended to carry out. Thus, Awlaki’s speech as a 
planner and organizer meets all three prongs of the enhanced test, 
and his speech satisfies the basis for speech-driven targeting. 
F. Awlaki as a Status-Based Target 
At the beginning of the analysis on Awlaki, there was a 
determination that although he declared himself a leader and 
member of AQAP, this declaration was of no legal consequence 
without a foundational conduct-based determination. Because 
Awlaki’s speech in planning and organizing Abdulmutallab’s 
attack satisfies the factors of the enhanced test for lawful conduct-
based targeting, his speech can support a status-based 
determination. Even though Awlaki began asserting his 
membership and leadership role in AQAP as early as 2007, it was 
not until he verbally participated in hostilities in late 2009 that he 
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became targetable for the duration of hostilities under a status-
based justification.171 United States’ legal opinions produced in 
mid-2010 support this conclusion that Awlaki was not targetable 
until he verbally participated in hostilities.172 
Awlaki was monitored by the United States since 
September 2001, and his name was associated with several 
terrorist plots in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada 
in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009.173 In all of these attacks, however, 
Awlaki’s influence was no more than the general propaganda and 
recruiting as seen in the cases previously mentioned. While none 
of the United States government memos or white papers produced 
to support the targeting of Awlaki mention speech-driven 
targeting or any of the enhanced factors outlined in this article, the 
timing of their publication indirectly supports the conclusions 
developed above.174 The first memo to support the targeting of 
Awlaki came five months after Abdulmutallab detailed the 
specific directions Awlaki gave in the failed 2009 attack.175 
Although Awlaki had generally inspired and recruited individuals 
to commit attacks before this, his language was never sufficiently 
specific or directed enough to be considered an imminent attack. 
Only after Awlaki’s speech in Abdulmutallab’s case came to light 
did the United States consider his actions targetable, thereby 
indirectly supporting the factors used and conclusions reached 
above.176 
G. Altering the Debate 
The justifications for the strike against Awlaki were 
widely discussed in the media, among international law scholars, 
and within the United States government. Despite this widespread 
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discussion, much of the debate centered on Awlaki’s actions, and 
status as a leader within AQAP, as opposed to his speech. 
However, as this article has shown, standard action-driven models 
are inadequate when considering speech-driven targeting. In 
particular, the debate surrounding Awlaki’s targeting was lacking 
in two respects. First, because an action-driven model was used to 
target Awlaki, the imminence standard was incorrectly applied, 
thereby leading the United States to include his role as a 
propagandist and recruiter in their targeting analysis, which is 
incorrect. As seen throughout this article, neither propagandists 
nor recruiter’s speech rises to the level of an imminent attack 
necessary to justify an attack. Second, even if the imminence 
standard was correctly applied, there remains a strong secondary 
argument that the basis and justifications for speech-driven 
targeting are inherently different than those in play in action 
centric-targeting. 
Speech, as one of the fundamental human rights and most 
vigilantly guarded of United States freedoms, deserves a higher 
and more defined standard for imminence. If the United States had 
applied the enhanced factors outlined by this article in targeting 
Awlaki, the international community would have had a valuable 
starting point for discussing how to target speech in an armed 
conflict. More importantly, the United States, and other States, 
would have had a basis to object when other States exceeded the 
boundaries of targetable speech. By defining and defending this 
line, the United States could continue to protect what is one of the 
most fundamental rights in a free global society. 
CONCLUSION 
This article explored state practices and guidance from 
international law commentators to conduct a descriptive analysis 
of speech-driven targeting. In doing so, an argument developed 
that speech-driven targeting, as currently defined and practiced, 
lacks sufficient definitional guidance to be considered an 
international norm. To remedy this lack of guidance, this article 
laid out a normative approach to speech-driven targeting. This 
proposed normative approach used the First Amendment to 
demonstrate how speech centric targeting can be morally and 
lawfully justified.  
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An enhanced test is desperately needed at this point in the 
law of armed conflict. State and non-state actors are using new 
communication mediums and modalities via the internet to use 
speech as a weapon against people and governments. International 
law must set clear guidelines for when States can lawfully take 
retaliatory action against this kind of speech. If international law 
fails to establish these guidelines, the use of force against 
controversial speech will become the norm on the international 
stage. The use of the internet also means that an ever-increasing 
amount of speech is monitored and collected by governments. As 
governments collect, store, and archive massive amounts of 
speech, difficult questions arise. Questions such as whether only 
the original speaker is targetable, or whether those who forward 
and repost speech may be targeted, and for how long is speech 
targetable? 
These questions are worth exploring, but they cannot be 
answered with any lucidity until basic definitional standards are 
established for speech-driven targeting. Finally, this article has 
focused on speech in the jus in bello context exclusively. A 
separate conversation must take place regarding what kinds of 
speech constitute an attack in the jus ad bellum context. This 
article represents only an initial effort to outline the discussion 
surrounding speech-driven targeting. When speech promotes 
violence tension forms between liberty and security. Only by 
creating clear definitions as to where the freedom of speech ends 
and the right to security begins, will States protect themselves and 
the freedoms they embody. 
